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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ideally, a trip to the pharmacist cures any feelings of nausea, but for 
many Americans just thinking about that trip makes their stomach churn.  
This is because of the outrageous prices most consumers find when they 
go to the checkout counter.  Biologics, an innovative new type of drug 
engineered from living organisms, cost an average of $45 per day.1  
Luckily, not all types of drugs are this expensive.  Pharmaceutical drugs, 
such as Tylenol, only cost an average of $2 per day.2  This is largely due 
to a strong market for generic pharmaceutical drugs which saved 
Americans “over a trillion dollars in healthcare costs between 2002 and 
2011.”3  Congress set out to improve the generic biologic market in 2009 
by passing the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 
(BPCIA),4 but consumers have yet to see much benefit.5 
The main reason consumers have not seen a significant price drop is 
time—the longer the BPCIA has been in effect the more prices will 
decline because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will approve 
more generic biologics.  However, courts are beginning to interpret the 
most important provisions of the BPCIA, and how well the judges do 
their job will have a huge effect on the healthcare market.  If the judges 
do their job correctly, the BPCIA could save the United States $250 
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 1.   Joseph P. Fuhr Jr., Lower Price, Greater Access to Life-Saving Drugs, THE HILL, July 30, 
2014, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/healthcare/213702-lower-price-greater-access-to-life-
saving-drugs. 
 2.   Id. 
 3.   Id. 
 4.   Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119, 804–28 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 21, 28, 29, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 5.   See Fuhr, supra note 1. 
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billion between 2014 and 2024.6  In July 2015, the Federal Circuit 
decided Amgen v. Sandoz,7 a case of first impression interpreting 42 
U.S.C. § 262(l), the section which is colloquially termed the “Patent 
Dance.”8  This decision has huge implications on how quickly and 
efficiently intellectual property disputes are handled under the BPCIA.  
The more quickly and efficiently parties solve these disputes, the sooner 
consumers will see generic biologics at the pharmacy at prices that do 
not upset the stomach. 
This Note establishes that the Federal Circuit erred in holding that 
companies can decide not to participate in the Patent Dance because the 
plain language of the statute, along with legislative intent, demand that 
the Patent Dance be mandatory. 
Part II begins by explaining the key terms of the BPCIA, including 
defining what a biologic is, how a biologic can be biosimilar to another 
biologic, and why it is important to have an abbreviated pathway to FDA 
approval.  Part II.B describes the Hatch-Waxman Act, which is the 
legislation that allowed companies to make generic versions of 
pharmaceutical drugs, and which was used as a model by the authors of 
the BPCIA.  Part II.C explains the Patent Dance in detail, including the 
procedures each company must follow to comply with it and why it is 
important.  Part II.D establishes the similarities and differences between 
the Hatch-Waxman Act and the BPCIA and why the BPCIA is an 
improvement on the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Finally, Part II.E analyzes the 
decision of the Federal Circuit in Amgen v. Sandoz and begins the 
discussion of why the court erred in not making the Patent Dance 
mandatory. 
Part III opens with a brief overview of the legislative history of the 
BPCIA, including a list of the important versions of the bill that were not 
turned into law.  Parts III.A.1–6 analyze each of those versions: the 
Second and Third Waxman Bills, the Inslee Bill, the Eshoo Bill, the 
Kennedy, Clinton, Hatch, and Enzi Bill, and the FTC Report, in more 
depth.  In each of these descriptions there is also an explanation of how 
those versions differ from the final BPCIA legislation and how those 
                                                          
 6.   Press Release, Steve Miller, Express Scripts, The $250 Billion Potential of Biosimilars 
Apr. 23, 2013, http://lab.express-scripts.com/insights/industry-updates/the-$250-billion-potential-of-
biosimilars. 
 7.   Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 
3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 15-1195). 
 8.   Carl J. Minniti III, Comment, Sandoz v. Amgen: Why Current Interpretation of the 
Biologic Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 Is Flawed and Jeopardizes Future 
Competition, 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 172, 178 (2015). 
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differences show that the BPCIA’s authors intended a mandatory Patent 
Dance. 
Part III.B describes how the court should have interpreted the Patent 
Dance provisions of the BPCIA, while adhering to legislative history, the 
plain meaning of the statute, and the rule against surplusage.  Finally, 
Part III.C recommends three different ways congressional members 
could rewrite the BPCIA to ensure the Patent Dance is interpreted as 
mandatory. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What Is the BPCIA? 
The BPCIA provides an abbreviated pathway to FDA approval for 
biosimilar biologics. A biologic is defined in the BPCIA as a “virus, 
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or 
derivative, allergenic product, [or] protein” used to improve health in 
human beings.9  This essentially means that if a medical product results 
from a living organism it meets the definition of a biologic.10  Scientists 
engineer these products from living organisms by creating “uniform and 
unique ‘cell lines’ of a specific bacterium, mammalian organ, or another 
cellular source.”11  This is an exceedingly difficult process requiring in-
depth knowledge of cell biology and protein synthesis.12 
Not all biologics qualify for the BPCIA’s abbreviated pathway, only 
those that are “biosimilar” to a “reference” product, otherwise known as 
a biologic that has already received FDA approval.13  This is important 
because every new prescription drug marketed in the United States must 
have FDA approval.14  Drug manufacturers acquire FDA approval for 
                                                          
 9.   42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012). 
 10.   Jordan Paradise, Follow-On Biologics: Implementation Challenges and Opportunities, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 502 (2011). 
 11.   Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 369 (2007). 
 12.   See id. 
In biologics production, scientists create uniform and unique “cell lines” of a specific 
bacterium, mammalian organ, or another cellular source.  This process begins by 
introducing the DNA that codes for the protein product of interest into the cell line; this 
DNA travels to the cellular nucleus, and the cellular machinery from the cell line reads 
the DNA and creates the protein. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 13.   See Sara Margolis, Note, Destined for Failure? An Analysis of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 209, 211 (2013). 
 14.   What Is the Approval Process for a New Prescription Drug?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 
[hereinafter Approval Process], http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194949 
.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2017). 
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their new drugs by first completing animal testing, and then moving on 
to a series of human clinical trials, referred to as phases.15 
The first phase of human clinical trials examines several safety 
measures and the most frequent side effects of the new drug by testing it 
in healthy volunteers.16  The next phase begins determinations on the 
effectiveness of the new drug by testing it in human subjects possessing 
the disease or condition the new drug attempts to alleviate.17  Finally, if 
both of the prior studies were successful, the FDA allows the new drug 
sponsor to test its drug on a significantly larger population to make final 
findings on the drug’s safety and effectiveness.18 
Upon completion of all required testing, the drug’s sponsor provides 
the FDA with an application for approval in the form of either a New 
Drug Application (NDA) or a Biologics License Application (BLA).19  If 
the new drug is a pharmaceutical drug, discussed infra, the sponsor files 
a NDA, while if the new drug is a biologic the sponsor files a BLA.20  
The two applications are largely similar and both must include the results 
from testing, information showing the manufacturer can adequately and 
accurately manufacture the drug, and a suggested label for the drug.  The 
label must include “necessary information about the drug, including uses 
for which it has been shown to be effective, possible risks, and how to 
use it.”21 
The abbreviated pathway created by the BPCIA allows a biosimilar 
manufacturer to skip these standard FDA requirements and instead rely 
on the animal testing and human clinical trials already completed by a 
reference product sponsor.  This saves the biosimilar manufacturer 
millions of dollars and years of research because the brand name 
biologic’s sponsor has already undertaken the studies.22  A biosimilar 
manufacturer can only do this if it can prove that its biologic is 
biosimilar to a reference product that already has approval. 
A biologic is considered biosimilar to a reference product when it is: 
                                                          
 15.   The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2017). 
 16.   Id. 
 17.   Id. 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Approval Process, supra note 14. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 19, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 794 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 15-1195). 
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(1) “highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor 
differences in clinically inactive components” and (2) the differences in 
“safety, purity, and potency” between the two products are negligible.23  
Although a biosimilar manufacturer does not have to complete the 
standard clinical trials required of a new biologic it must still complete 
enough studies to show that it meets these two requirements.  Much of 
the preceding discussion applies to the Hatch-Waxman Act as well 
because Congress modeled the BPCIA on the Hatch-Waxman Act.24 
B. Generic Pharmaceutical Drug Pathway 
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 to provide a 
pathway to FDA approval for generic pharmaceutical drugs.25  In much 
the same way that biosimilar manufacturers can skip an extensive FDA 
approval process, so can manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical drugs.  
Pharmaceutical drugs are made from wholly inanimate matter that reacts 
identically every time the same stimuli are introduced.26  These drugs 
have a low molecular weight; their structures have been completely 
characterized; they are chemically stable; and they are mostly non-
immunogenic.27  By comparison, biologics are considerably larger; they 
cannot be fully characterized; they are chemically unstable and sensitive 
to external stimuli; and they are potentially immunogenic.28  For 
example, Procrit, a common biologic, is 200 times larger than 
acetaminophen, a common small-molecule drug.29 
There is also a major difference in how the two types of drugs are 
manufactured.30  Because pharmaceutical drugs are small, they can 
generally be manufactured using “well-established, consistent” 
methods.31  However, biologics “are not uniformly produced through 
traditional manufacturing,” and even a small change in chemical 
                                                          
 23.   42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A), (B) (2012). 
 24.   Minniti III, supra note 8, at 177. 
 25.   Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 26.   See Liang, supra note 11, at 367. 
 27.   Paul J. Declerck, Biologicals and Biosimilars: A Review of the Science and Its 
Implications, 1 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 13, 13 (2012). 
 28.   Id. 
 29.   Charles Davis, Note, Take Two and Call Congress in the Morning: How the Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act May Fail to Prevent Systemic Abuses in the Follow-On 
Biologics Approval Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1262–63 (2013). 
 30.   Id. at 1263. 
 31.   Id. 
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structure can have a huge impact on the biologic’s efficacy.32  Biologics 
are made using living cells and “no two cell lines, developed 
independently, can be considered identical.”33  Furthermore, “the quality 
attributes of the final [biologic] inherently vary with the type of host cell, 
the growth conditions, the purification process, the formulation, and the 
storage conditions.”34  This places a huge importance on method patents 
to protect manufacturing of biologics that is not necessary with 
pharmaceutical drugs.35  The ease with which pharmaceutical drugs are 
copied has created a huge market for generics using the Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) laid out in the Hatch-Waxman Act.36 
The ANDA pathway is actually easier to comply with than the 
biosimilar pathway because a generic pharmaceutical drug only has to 
show that its active ingredients are the same,37 the “route of 
administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the new drug are the 
same as those of the listed drug,”38 and the labeling is the same.39  The 
ANDA pathway pays no regard to the differences in the safety or 
effectiveness between the brand name product and the generic follow-
on.40  Differences in safety and effectiveness can be disregarded because 
once the active ingredients, administration route, dosage form, and 
strength of the generic pharmaceutical are shown to be identical to the 
brand name product, there are no differences in safety and 
effectiveness.41 
Congress’s stated goal in enacting the BPCIA and the Hatch-
Waxman Act was to create a market for generic drugs that cost 
substantially less than the brand name versions they are biosimilar or 
identical to.42  Congress addressed this goal for pharmaceutical drugs 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act which has allowed generics to enter the 
                                                          
 32.   Id. 
 33.   Declerck, supra note 27, at 13. 
 34.   Id. at 14. 
 35.   See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 36.   21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 37.   Id. § 355(j)(2)(ii)(I–III). 
 38.   Id. § 355(j)(2)(iii). 
 39.   Id. § 355(j)(2)(v). 
 40.   See id. § 355(j)(2) (setting out all the requirements for a follow-on generic drug that does 
not provide for any extra safety or effectiveness documentation). 
 41.   See Declerck, supra note 27, at 14 (“For a generic . . . drug, it is sufficient to demonstrate 
comparable quality . . . with a reference (innovator) product to obtain regulatory approval.”). 
 42.   Letter from Rep. Anna G. Eshoo et al. to President Barack Obama 1 (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/house-letter.pdf (“Following in the footsteps of the earlier Hatch-
Waxman Act, which ushered in a new era of competition and affordable drugs, the [BPCIA] would 
for the very first time allow patients access to generic, cheaper versions of biologic drugs.”). 
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market “25 percent lower than the branded drug’s price.  The price 
discount can rise to 80 percent with multiple generic entrants.”43  As of 
February 2017, the FDA has only approved four drugs as biosimilar 
under the BPCIA; the first biosimilar went to U.S. market at a 15% 
wholesale price reduction.44  Commentators are bearish on whether the 
BPCIA will ever have the same price-reducing impact on biologics that 
the Hatch-Waxman Act has had on pharmaceutical drugs.45  Although 
the BPCIA is based on the Hatch-Waxman Act, and they both attempt to 
achieve the same result, there are significant differences between the two 
in terms of their patent provisions. 
C. What Is the Patent Dance? 
The Patent Dance describes how intellectual property issues that 
arise between the reference product sponsor and the biosimilar applicant 
should be handled unless both parties agree to another method.46  The 
Dance begins when a biosimilar applicant submits its application to the 
FDA.47  At this time, the biosimilar applicant provides its application and 
information on its manufacturing process to the reference product 
sponsor, and may provide it to any third-party patent owners, all of 
whom must keep this information confidential.48 
Upon receiving the application, the reference product sponsor uses 
this information to determine which patents it reasonably believes the 
biosimilar applicant will infringe upon by going to market.49  The 
reference product sponsor sends this list of patents back to the biosimilar 
                                                          
 43.   MICHAEL S. WROBLEWSKI ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE 
ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION 12 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-
federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf. 
 44.   Steven Ross Johnson, Sandoz Launches Sale of Biosimilar Zarxio, MODERN HEALTHCARE 
(Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150903/NEWS/150909949 
(announcing biosimilar Zarxio); Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Inflectra, 
a Biosimilar to Remicade (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/ucm494227.htm (announcing FDA approval of biosimilar Inflectra); Press 
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Erelzi, a Biosimilar to Enbrel (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm518639.htm (announcing 
FDA approval of biosimilar Erelzi); Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves 
Amjevita, a Biosimilar to Humira (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/ucm522243.htm (announcing FDA approval of biosimilar Amjevita). 
 45.   E.g., Margolis, supra note 13, at 222–36. 
 46.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)(A) (2012). 
 47.   Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)(i). 
 48.   Id. § 262(l)(1)(B)(ii), (l)(B)(iii), (l)(2). 
 49.   Id. § 262(l)(1)(D). 
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applicant who analyzes the list, and, for each patent, asserts that the 
patent is “invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed” by going to 
market.50  Alternatively, the biosimilar applicant can agree not to go to 
market until certain patents have expired.51  Finally, for every patent that 
the biosimilar applicant believes is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be 
infringed, the reference product sponsor must respond with why the 
patent is valid, enforceable, or will be infringed.52  This back and forth 
communication is where the name Patent Dance comes from, and it is 
important that the parties participate in it for several reasons.53 
First, the parties use these lists to determine which patents will be 
involved in litigation.54  Having access to these lists and the biosimilar 
applicant’s application are especially important for method patents.55  
Method patents in this case would cover the specific manufacturing 
process used by the reference product sponsor, which are important 
because the best way to make a biosimilar biologic is to use the same or 
a very similar manufacturing process.56  Without this information on the 
biosimilar applicant’s manufacturing process, the reference product 
sponsor will not know if their method patents have been infringed.57  In 
such a case, the reference product sponsor would risk Rule 11 sanctions 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if it initiates a patent 
infringement suit on the method patents because the processes used by 
the biosimilar applicant could be totally different.58 
Second, participation in the Patent Dance “open[s] the courthouse 
doors.”59  The BPCIA amended the Patent Act to allow for a constructive 
act of infringement when the biosimilar applicant submits an application, 
insuring that litigation can occur quickly and efficiently.60  Without this 
constructive act of infringement the courts would have no jurisdiction to 
hear the case because there would be no case or controversy.61  The 
                                                          
 50.   Id. § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(I). 
 51.   Id. § 262(l)(3)(B)(ii)(II). 
 52.   Id. § 262(l)(3)(C). 
 53.   Minniti III, supra note 8, at 178–79. 
 54.   Id. 
 55.   Leslie-Anne Maxwell et al., BPCIA: How Long Is The Party, And Do I Have To Dance?, 
LAW360, Mar. 24, 2015, http://www.law360.com/articles/631861/bpcia-how-long-is-the-party-and-
do-i-have-to-dance. 
 56.   Jeremiah J. Kelly & Michael David, No Longer “If,” But “When”: The Coming 
Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On Biologics, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 115, 119–20 (2009). 
 57.   Maxwell et al., supra note 55. 
 58.   Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (prescribing sanctions for frivolous actions). 
 59.   Minniti III, supra note 8, at 179. 
 60.   Id. (discussing amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)). 
 61.   Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 
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Patent Act typically withholds jurisdiction until a party “without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.”62  
The biosimilar applicant might not be able to make, use, offer to sell, or 
sell their biosimilar until the reference product sponsor’s exclusive sale 
period is almost expired.  As soon as the reference product sponsor’s 
exclusive sale period expires, the biosimilar applicant wants to start 
making its biosimilar, not have to wait several more years for litigation 
to end.  The BPCIA ensures the parties do not have to wait so long to 
initiate a suit. 
It is important to note that the Patent Act also allows for a 
constructive act of infringement when: 
[T]he applicant for the application fails to provide the application and 
information required . . . if the purpose of such submission is to obtain 
approval under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, 
or sale of a drug, veterinary biological product, or biological product 
claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the 
expiration of such patent.63 
This provision could be construed to satisfy the case or controversy 
requirement when a biosimilar applicant decides not to participate in the 
Patent Dance, but the provision cannot be construed this way without 
serious negative consequences.  Using this provision to bring a 
declaratory judgment action introduces the risk of Rule 11 sanctions 
against reference product sponsors because they would not have the 
information necessary to bring a good faith suit. 
D. Hatch-Waxman Act’s Similarities and Differences to the BPCIA 
The BPCIA is based, in part, on the Hatch-Waxman Act, but there 
are some significant deviations, especially in the patent provisions.64  
The Hatch-Waxman Act ensures the general public, including generic 
drug makers, have the information they need regarding patents listed in 
the Orange Book.65  The Orange Book tells generic drug makers all of 
                                                          
464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted) (noting that there must be an “actual or threatened injury” fairly 
traceable to the conduct of the defendant). 
 62.   35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 63.   Id. § 271(e)(2)(C)(ii). 
 64.   Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 815–16 (2010); Davis, supra 
note 29, at 1259. 
 65.   See Carver et al., supra note 64, at 815. 
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the patents that a brand name manufacturer has on its products.66  This is 
significantly different than the BPCIA where all patent disclosures are 
done in private, subject to strict confidentiality requirements.67  The 
BPCIA’s system could allow the biosimilar applicant and the reference 
product sponsor to “collude against third parties or enter pay-to-delay 
settlements.”68 
One important advantage reference product sponsors receive under 
the BPCIA, which they would not receive under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
is how method patents are handled.  The Hatch-Waxman Act does not 
cover method patents, and they cannot even be listed in the Orange 
Book.69  The BPCIA specifically states that manufacturing information 
shall be exchanged during the Patent Dance, and these patents can clearly 
be asserted in litigation.70  This is unsurprising when one considers the 
differences in manufacturing the two types of drugs.71  The authors of the 
BPCIA realized that manufacturing of generic pharmaceuticals was 
standard, requiring only a “formulaic stepwise approach,”72 and the 
method patents would not be that important.  Whereas, some brand name 
biologics manufacturers will almost certainly depend on method patents 
to ensure they retain exclusivity. 
Finally, the differences in how the patent litigation proceeds are 
perhaps the largest departure between the two bills.  The Hatch-Waxman 
Act does not have anything as extensive as the Patent Dance, and all 
constructive-infringement litigation stems from a “Paragraph IV” 
certification which states that the generic manufacturer does not believe 
the brand name manufacturer’s patents are valid or they will not be 
infringed by manufacture of the generic.73  After this certification has 
been made, the parties proceed to litigation using “traditional patent 
infringement analysis.”74  As was extensively noted in the Patent Dance 
discussion, the authors of the BPCIA attempted to script every part of 
biosimilar patent litigation.75 
                                                          
 66.   See id. 
 67.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1) (2012). 
 68.   Davis, supra note 29, at 1260 (footnotes omitted). 
 69.   Carver et al., supra note 64, at 815. 
 70.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A). 
 71.   See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 72.   See Liang, supra note 11, at 367. 
 73.   Colleen Kelly, Comment, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-
Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417, 423–24 (2011) (citing 
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012)). 
 74.   See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 75.   See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
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This final difference is the most salient to this Note because it helps 
explain why Congress wanted the Patent Dance to be mandatory.  The 
authors of the BPCIA specifically acknowledged they were modeling the 
BPCIA on the Hatch-Waxman Act, and yet the two pieces of legislation 
differ greatly in how patent litigation proceeds.  One logical conclusion 
from this is that the authors of the BPCIA were concerned that under the 
Hatch-Waxman patent litigation provisions, biosimilar applicants would 
not have access to method patents before filing an infringement suit.76  
The complexity of manufacturing biologics makes method patents vital 
to biologic manufacturers who want to protect their investment and could 
often be the only patent they have.77  Under the Hatch-Waxman patent 
provisions, a biologic manufacturer would have to file suit against the 
biosimilar manufacturer without knowing how the biologic is 
manufactured.78  This would open them up to Rule 11 sanctions if the 
manufacturing processes used by the biosimilar and biologic 
manufacturers are completely different.79 
The authors of the BPCIA recognized this as a threat to the incentive 
to create new biologics so they deviated from the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and designed stricter rules.  Patents are widely considered more 
important to the pharmaceutical industry as compared to other industries 
because of the high R&D costs and ease of free riding.80  The Patent 
Dance insures that if a biologic manufacturer accepts the risk of 
developing a new drug, that manufacturer will be able to protect against 
free riding.  When the biosimilar applicant is not forced to participate in 
the Patent Dance, the litigation basically reverts to the same provisions 
used in the Hatch-Waxman Act.  If Congress wanted this, they would 
have adopted the Hatch-Waxman patent provisions word for word. 
Commentators writing about the Patent Dance before Amgen v. 
Sandoz discussed the provision as either “required,” “requirements for 
biosimilar applicants,” or “requires a process of information exchange.”81  
However, the Federal Circuit reached a different result by finding that 
                                                          
 76.   See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 77.   See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 30–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 78.   See supra note 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 79.   See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 80.   Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L 
ECON. LAW 849, 850–53 (2002). 
 81.   Minniti III, supra note 8, at 178; Paradise, supra note 10, at 507; Donna M. Gitter, 
Informed by the European Union Experience: What the United States Can Anticipate and Learn 
from the European Union’s Regulatory Approach to Biosimilars, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 559, 568 
(2011). 
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the Patent Dance was completely optional. 
E. Amgen v. Sandoz 
In Amgen v. Sandoz, the Northern District of California District 
Court interpreted a key provision of the BPCIA, finding that a biosimilar 
applicant can choose not to participate in the Patent Dance.82  The district 
court found that the biosimilar applicant could opt out of the Patent 
Dance because the BPCIA explicitly defined what the consequences for 
doing so would be in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C).83  The district court stated 
that “[t]he BPCIA’s plain language and overall statutory scheme support 
a reading that renders [the Patent Dance] entirely permissible.”84 
The case was appealed by Amgen Inc. to the Federal Circuit where 
the district court’s ruling was reviewed de novo and the Patent Dance 
decision was affirmed.85  The Federal Circuit began by discussing the use 
of “shall” in several sections of the statute86 but specifically in one part 
which reads as follows: “When a [biosimilar] applicant submits an 
application under subsection (k), such applicant shall provide . . . 
confidential access to the information required to be produced pursuant 
to paragraph (2) and any other information that the [biosimilar] applicant 
determines, in its sole discretion, to be appropriate . . . .”87  The court 
apparently agreed with Sandoz’s argument that this is merely a 
“condition precedent to engaging in the information-exchange process of 
paragraphs (l)(3) through (l)(6), not a mandatory requirement in all 
circumstances.”88 
The court admitted that the plain language of the statute requires 
participation in the Patent Dance “when an applicant chooses the 
abbreviated pathway.”89  This creates a criterion in the word “when” that 
a biosimilar applicant can choose not to meet.90  Meaning, if a biosimilar 
applicant does not choose the abbreviated pathway, it does not have to 
                                                          
 82.   Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 14-cv-04741, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34537, at *21 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 19, 2015), relevant holding aff’d, 794 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 15-1195).  The court also looked at when notice of 
commercial marketing can be given, but this Note will only discuss the Patent Dance provisions.   
 83.   Id. at *34. 
 84.   Id. at *21. 
 85.   Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 15-1195). 
 86.   Id. at 135455. 
 87.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 88.   Amgen Inc., 794 F.3d at 1355. 
 89.   Id. 
 90.   Id. 
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participate in the Patent Dance.91  However, such a reading is misleading 
because the only way for a biosimilar applicant to actually become a 
biosimilar applicant is to use the abbreviated pathway.92  If a biosimilar 
applicant is not using the abbreviated pathway, it would not be a 
biosimilar applicant, it would be undergoing the longer approval process 
of a reference product; so, the “when” criterion is always met. 
After apparently deciding the “when” criterion was not met in 
Amgen, but not explaining that decision in any way, the court suggested 
that other sections of the Act make the Patent Dance optional.93  The 
court cited 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) which states “‘[i]f a [biosimilar] 
applicant fails to provide the application and information required under 
paragraph (2)(A),’ then the [reference product sponsor], but not the 
[biosimilar] applicant, may bring a declaratory judgment action.”94  This 
is a statutorily created remedy invoked when a biosimilar applicant does 
not participate in the Patent Dance, and the court said reading the BPCIA 
any other way would make that remedy section superfluous, which the 
court wanted to strongly avoid.95  This is the same rationale used by the 
district court, and both decisions ignore the plain language of the statute, 
ignore the legislative history of the BPCIA, and come to the wrong 
conclusions on whether the Patent Dance is optional. 
The rest of this Note will show how the legislative history of the 
BPCIA clearly calls for a mandatory Patent Dance, how the Federal 
Circuit could have construed the statute to comply with the legislative 
history, and further how Congress could amend the BPCIA to ensure the 
Patent Dance is mandatory. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Although statutory interpretation usually begins with the plain 
language of a statute,96 the BPCIA’s conflicting use of the word “shall” 
with a remedy for not participating in the Patent Dance creates an 
ambiguity.  When a statute is ambiguous, legislative history becomes a 
helpful clue in understanding the intent of Congress.97  Furthermore, 
                                                          
 91.   Id. 
 92.   See supra Part I.A. 
 93.   See Amgen Inc., 794 F.3d at 1355. 
 94.   Id. at 1356 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) (2012)) (first alteration in original). 
 95.   Id. 
 96.   Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 764 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“As with any question of statutory interpretation, the starting point is 
the language of the statute itself.”). 
 97.   See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43, 862–63 
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differences between any proposed bills and the bill actually enacted by 
Congress are relevant in interpreting a statute.98  In the case of the 
BPCIA, Congress had several markedly different versions of the Patent 
Dance to choose from.  Representatives Waxman, Inslee, and Eshoo all 
submitted unique bills to the House while Senators Kennedy, Clinton, 
Hatch, and Enzi worked together on one bill in the Senate.  After 
considering each of these options, the BPCIA’s authors ultimately wrote 
comprehensive patent provisions into the Act.  By examining the 
relevant alternatives below, this Note will show that the bill’s authors 
chose these comprehensive provisions for a reason, and never intended 
for the Patent Dance to be optional. 
A. Legislative History 
1. Second Waxman Bill 
H.R. 1038, known as the Second Waxman Bill, would allow the 
biosimilar applicant to request patent information from the reference 
product sponsor after which the reference product sponsor would have 60 
days to reply with a list of patents that it “believes in good faith” relate to 
the product at issue.99  The reference product sponsor had to provide all 
patents claiming “the approved biological product, any method of using 
such product, any component of such product, or any method or process 
of manufacturing such product or component.”100 
Any time after the biosimilar applicant received the patent 
information it could, but did not have to, notify the reference product 
sponsor of its application and submit a notice to the reference product 
sponsor that stated the factual and legal basis for why a patent is invalid, 
unenforceable, or would not be infringed.101  Also included must be one 
or more jurisdictions where the biosimilar applicant consented to suit.102  
Finally, the bill explicitly stated “[a]n applicant or prospective applicant 
for a comparable biological product under this subsection may not be 
compelled, by court order or otherwise, to initiate the procedures set 
                                                          
(1984). 
 98.   See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860–62 (1985) (finding it relevant for statutory 
interpretation purposes that Congress revised a proposed bill “to eliminate the words ‘for business 
purposes’ from the description of covered property”). 
 99.   Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2007) (section 
(k)(17)(A)(i) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 100.   Id.  
 101.   Id. (section (k)(17)(B) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 102.   Id. 
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forth in this paragraph.”103 
The Second Waxman Bill essentially provided for a simplified 
version of the BPCIA.  It allowed for the parties to exchange patent 
information, but most importantly it explicitly made every step of the 
process optional.  For example, the biosimilar applicant “may” request 
patent information;104 upon receiving this patent information the 
biosimilar applicant “may” reply with reasons why there will be no 
infringement;105 and finally, the last paragraph of the relevant section 
literally states that the entire process is optional. 
This is in sharp contrast to the BPCIA, which states the biosimilar 
applicant “shall” provide the reference product sponsor with its 
application and any information on its manufacturing process, the 
reference product sponsor “shall” respond with patents that could 
reasonably be asserted, after which the biosimilar applicant “shall” reply 
with why there will not be infringement, and the reference product 
sponsor “shall” state why there will in fact be infringement.106  Also, 
there is no separate paragraph making these disclosures explicitly 
optional. 
This sharp contrast in language cannot be accidental.  The authors of 
the BPCIA had more than enough options for how to make the BPCIA’s 
patent provisions optional by looking at the plain language of the Second 
Waxman Bill and adopting it.  They could have simply substituted “may” 
everywhere they had “shall,” and the plain language would have been 
clearly permissive.  Furthermore, by deciding not to adopt the explicit 
provision in the Second Waxman Bill making the entire process 
permissive, the authors provided strong evidence that they intended it to 
be mandatory. 
2. Inslee Bill 
H.R. 1956, known as the Inslee Bill, is widely considered the 
simplest of all the biosimilar bills because it left out many of the features 
found in the other bills including pediatric market exclusivity and patent 
provisions.107  The Inslee Bill did not provide any guidance for how the 
                                                          
 103.   Id. (section (k)(17)(E) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 104.   Id. (section (k)(17)(A)(i) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 105.   Id. (section (k)(17)(B) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 106.   See 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2012). 
 107.   See Colleen Tracy & Christopher Loh, Variations on a Theme: Five Proposed Abbreviated 
Approval Pathways for Biogenerics, BLOOMBERG L. REP. HEALTH L., Apr. 2009, at 4, 
http://cache.fitzpatrickcella.com/wp-content/uploads/attachment528.pdf. 
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reference product sponsor and biosimilar applicant should disclose their 
patents to each other or how they should conduct patent litigation.108  In 
fact, the bill does not mention the word “patent” a single time.109 
This is considerably different from the BPCIA, which regulates 
patent disclosures to the nth degree by providing for an extensive series 
of back and forth communication.  The authors of the final BPCIA 
legislation must have thought the patent provisions were important or 
they would have followed the lead of the Inslee Bill and simply ignored 
any patent provisions.  There is a strong statutory presumption against 
making any section superfluous or even insignificant.110  Including so 
much language on how patent disclosures would proceed, when the 
authors had the option to not include any provisions at all, clearly shows 
they wanted to make the section significant, and reading the section as 
optional does the opposite.  Interpreting the Patent Dance as optional 
makes the entire section insignificant and borderline superfluous because 
by not following it, biosimilar applicants gain the advantage of filing the 
suit on their terms. 
3. Eshoo Bill 
H.R. 5629, known as the Eshoo Bill, is very similar to the BPCIA 
with the main difference being that the BPCIA adds a few more steps to 
its Patent Dance.  The Eshoo Bill states that within thirty days of the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services accepting the biosimilar 
applicant’s application, the applicant must provide the reference product 
sponsor with its application including a “detailed description of the 
biosimilar product, its method of manufacture, and the materials used in 
the manufacture of the product.”111  After receiving the application, the 
reference product sponsor must respond with a list of patents it believes 
are “relevant” and explain why these relevant patents would be 
infringed.112 
Upon receiving this information, the biosimilar applicant must 
                                                          
 108.   See Patient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 110th 
Cong. (2007). 
 109.   See id. 
 110.   TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory 
construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no 
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
 111.   Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. § 101(a)(2) (2008) (section 
(l)(4)(A)(i) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 112.   Id. (sections (l)(4)(A)(ii) and (l)(4)(C) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
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respond by either agreeing not to go to market until the relevant patents 
expire, or stating why the relevant patent will not be infringed or is 
invalid.113  The reference product sponsor then must decide within sixty 
days whether to sue.114  If it decides to do so and the court finds 
infringement, then the Secretary will not make approval effective until 
after patent expiry.115 
Just like the BPCIA, the Eshoo Bill uses the word “shall” each time 
it refers to the obligations of the reference product sponsor or the 
biosimilar applicant in regards to patent disclosures.116  However, fewer 
communications between the two parties are required under the Eshoo 
Bill as compared to the BPCIA.  This is important because it means the 
authors of the BPCIA put even more emphasis on the patent provisions 
than the most similar bill it could be compared to; so, the authors are 
even less likely to want those provisions to be seen as insignificant.  The 
court should view the added steps in the BPCIA as an intentional choice 
that the authors want all parties to comply with. 
4. Third Waxman Bill 
H.R. 1427, known as the Third Waxman Bill, is very similar to the 
Second Waxman Bill with a few minor changes.  This bill does not allow 
the biosimilar applicant to choose the jurisdiction for the infringement 
suit.117  It also adds a subsection that creates a case or controversy in all 
Article III courts so infringement suits can be filed pre-marketing.118  
This bill retains the discretionary language from the previous one that 
made any participation by the biosimilar applicant completely 
optional.119 
This Waxman Bill is important to show that the language in the 
Second Waxman Bill was not a solitary example of another way the 
BPCIA could have been written. Instead, it was an example considered 
                                                          
 113.   Id. (section (l)(4)(D) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 114.   Id. (section (l)(5) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 115.   Id. 
 116.   Id. (sections (l)(4)(A), (C), and (D) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 117.   Compare Promoting Innovation and Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act (Third Waxman 
Bill), H.R. 1427, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009) (section (k)(18)(C) of the proposed amendment to 42 
U.S.C. § 262), with Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act (Second Waxman Bill), H.R. 1038, 110th 
Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2007) (sections (k)(17)(B)(iii), (C) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262) 
(requiring the infringement action to take place in one of the judicial districts specified by the 
applicant). 
 118.   Id. (section (k)(18)(E) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 119.   Id. (section (k)(18)(F) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262); see supra note 104 
and accompanying text. 
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in multiple terms but eventually discarded in favor of the mandatory 
language of the BPCIA. 
5. Kennedy, Clinton, Hatch, and Enzi Bill 
S. 1695, sharing the name BPCIA with the final legislation, is 
essentially the first draft of the BPCIA.120  Because Congress chose this 
bill for its final legislation, the patent provisions in it are largely the same 
and were discussed above;121 however, there are some important points 
to note.  In the discussion drafts leading up to this bill, Congress was not 
going to require the biosimilar applicant to provide information on its 
manufacturing process to the reference product sponsor.122  S. 1695 and 
the BPCIA both include explicit language to the contrary and state that 
the manufacturing information must be disclosed.123 
Disclosure of manufacturing information is important because the 
reference product sponsor needs to know how the biosimilar applicant 
makes its biologic so it can figure out if there is infringement of any 
method patents.124  By making the Patent Dance optional, the Amgen 
court has nullified the BPCIA’s authors’ direct intent to have the parties 
exchange manufacturing information.125  Under the court’s current 
ruling, a biosimilar applicant can copy the reference product sponsor’s 
method patents, opt out of the Patent Dance, and then hope the reference 
product sponsor does not sue to learn the biosimilar applicant’s process 
in discovery. 
The reference product sponsor will want to sue because it believes 
there is a chance the biosimilar applicant is copying the method patents, 
but if the reference product sponsor sues and is ultimately wrong then it 
could face Rule 11 sanctions.  This is an unacceptable scenario for 
reference product sponsors looking to protect their investment, and one 
that becomes all too likely when the Patent Dance is optional.  The 
nondisclosure of manufacturing information is one of the biggest 
problems with interpreting the Patent Dance as optional, and here is clear 
legislative history showing that Congress paid special attention to this 
issue and ultimately decided that it needed to be in the final bill. 
                                                          
 120.   Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 121.   See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
 122.   Carver et al., supra note 64, at 756. 
 123.   S. 1695, § 2(a)(2) (section (l)(2)(A) of the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262); 42 
U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). 
 124.   See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
 125.   See supra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, the BPCIA’s authors actually considered alternative 
processes for the exchange of patent information.126  The first process 
they considered, and eventually rejected, was an optional notification 
system where the two parties could choose whether they wanted to notify 
each other of relevant patents.127  The authors turned that system down in 
favor of a “mandatory information exchange process.”128  This is nearly 
conclusive proof that not only did the authors carefully consider 
alternatives to their final patent provision language, but they also 
believed that the parties would be required to participate in the Patent 
Dance. 
6. FTC Report 
One of the final considerations taken into account by Congress 
before enacting the BPCIA was a report by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).129  One of the main findings the FTC made was that 
any patent provisions in a biosimilars bill are unnecessary.130  The FTC 
stated that “[a] special pre-approval patent resolution process is unlikely 
to succeed in raising and resolving all pertinent patent issues prior to 
FDA approval” because of the numerous and varied patents that protect 
biological drugs.131  Although the FTC’s report did not appear to have an 
impact on the final legislation, the report highlights the fact that 
Congress had a lot of options to consider before deciding on the patent 
provisions. 
The authors of the BPCIA disagreed with the FTC report because 
they designed extensive patent provisions.132  They put those provisions 
in because they wanted them to be followed, every time, not simply 
when the biosimilar applicant decided to comply.  If the authors wanted 
biosimilar applicants to have a choice, they could have heeded the FTC 
Report, chosen the Inslee Bill, and let the parties decide for 
themselves.133  They did not do that.  Furthermore, Congress had the 
perfect example of how to write an optional Patent Dance–like system in 
                                                          
 126.   Carver et al., supra note 64, at 757. 
 127.   Id. 
 128.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 129.   See Carver et al., supra 64, at 790 (discussing the timing of WROBLEWSKI ET AL., supra 
note 43). 
 130.   WROBLEWSKI ET AL., supra note 43, at viii–ix. 
 131.   Id. at viii. 
 132.   See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text. 
 133.   See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
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the two Waxman bills.134  Those two bills included a provision that stated 
the biosimilar applicant did not have to participate in the information 
exchange.135  The authors of the BPCIA did not choose either of those 
bills. 
Congress could have chosen any of these previous bills, in whole or 
in part, to make up the final legislation; so, it is fair to assume that they 
picked the patent provisions in the BPCIA for a reason.  There is a 
presumption that Congress did not intend “to enact statutory language 
that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”136  The patent 
provisions in the BPCIA are the most developed and most structured of 
any of the available options.137  The authors wished to set up a thorough 
step-by-step process requiring the biosimilar applicant and reference 
product sponsor to fairly and efficiently litigate any disputed patents. 
B. Correctly Construing the Patent Dance Provisions 
The court should have construed the BPCIA so that the Patent Dance 
would be mandatory without making any of the sections superfluous.  
Statutory interpretation always begins with the plain language of a 
statute.138  As has been noted, the BPCIA specifically states a biosimilar 
applicant “shall” provide the reference product sponsor with its 
application and manufacturing information.139  Typically, when 
legislation includes the word “shall,” a court equates that word to a 
mandatory requirement.140  However, because the statute appears to offer 
a remedy for when a biosimilar applicant refuses to provide the required 
information, it is ambiguous whether “shall” can actually mean 
mandatory.141  Since it is clear from the legislative history that the 
authors of the BPCIA meant for the Patent Dance to be mandatory, the 
                                                          
 134.   See supra notes 99–103, 117–119 and accompanying text. 
 135.   Id. 
 136.   Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392–93 (1980) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
 137.   Compare 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) (2012) (legislating extensive patent procedures), with H.R. 
5629 (Eshoo Bill), 110th Cong. (2008) (legislating patent procedures with several less steps), H.R. 
1956 (Inslee Bill), 110th Cong. (2007) (legislating no patent procedures), and H.R. 1038 (Second 
Waxman Bill), 110th Cong. (2007) (legislating patent procedures with several fewer steps). 
 138.   Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 764 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“As with any question of statutory interpretation, the starting point is 
the language of the statute itself.”). 
 139.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A) (2012). 
 140.   Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 803 N.E.2d 914, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 141.   See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
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Federal Circuit should have construed the statute to do that.142 
A significant part of the court’s argument relies on the supposed 
alternative remedy for not participating in the Patent Dance found in the 
BPCIA.  That subsection reads: 
If a [biosimilar] applicant fails to provide the application and 
information required under paragraph (2)(A), the reference product 
sponsor, but not the [biosimilar] applicant, may bring an action under 
section 2201 of title 28 [United States Code] for a declaration of 
infringement, validity, or enforceability of any patent that claims the 
biological product or a use of the biological product.143 
The court concluded that “may” meant the reference product sponsor 
only had two options if the biosimilar applicant failed to participate in 
the Patent Dance: the reference product sponsor could choose to bring a 
declaratory judgment action or not bring any action at all.144 
The court was concerned that if the Patent Dance was mandatory 
then there would be no need for that entire section and it would become 
superfluous.145  However, this does not have to be the case; the Patent 
Dance can be mandatory and that section can still have significance.  The 
correct construction of that section is that it adds an extra right to the 
reference product sponsor without removing any options.  The reference 
product sponsor “may” choose to bring an immediate declaratory 
judgment action as the plain language states, it “may” choose to bring no 
action at all, or the reference product sponsor “may” still choose to 
enforce the Patent Dance provisions. 
This solution ensures that nothing the BPCIA’s authors wrote 
becomes superfluous but still follows their intent that the Patent Dance 
should be followed except when both parties agree to another method.  
The statute specifically allows the parties to choose not to follow the 
Patent Dance provisions if, and only if, both of them agree.146  If a 
biosimilar applicant does not comply with the Patent Dance provisions, 
then it knows it is opening itself to a declaratory judgment action.  If the 
reference product sponsor decides to bring a declaratory judgment action 
instead of enforcing the Patent Dance, then the parties are essentially 
agreeing to traditional litigation.  If this is not what the reference product 
                                                          
 142.   See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text. 
 143.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) (2012). 
 144.   Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1355–57 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 
U.S.L.W. 3549 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) (No. 15-1195). 
 145.   Id. at 1356. 
 146.   42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(1)(A) (2012). 
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sponsor wants, then it should be free to enforce the Patent Dance because 
it did not agree to forego those provisions. 
The counterargument is that the alternative remedy section under the 
construction advocated by this Note would not technically become 
superfluous but would lose all of its importance.  The belief is that no 
biosimilar applicant would choose to forego the Patent Dance, where it 
has specific rights, in favor of letting the reference product sponsor bring 
a declaratory judgment action.  This would seem to favor the reference 
product sponsor because it gives them the advantage of deciding when 
and where to bring the suit.  However, Amgen v. Sandoz itself defeats 
that argument.  Sandoz knew when it decided to forego the Patent Dance 
that Amgen would bring a declaratory judgment action.  Sandoz 
specifically told Amgen to bring a declaratory judgment action in its 
letter to Amgen informing them of its decision not to participate in the 
Patent Dance.147  Sandoz decided it had more advantages in a declaratory 
judgment action than under the Patent Dance, or the company would not 
have made the choice it did.  There is no reason to believe other 
biosimilar applicants would not make the same decisions, and sometimes 
the reference product sponsor will agree and want to do a declaratory 
judgment action as well. 
Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) is supposed to be a penalty to 
the biosimilar applicant for not following the Patent Dance.  However, 
the way the Amgen court has construed the BPCIA it is not a penalty at 
all; it just allows the biosimilar applicant to choose the litigation method 
on its own.  Adopting the interpretation of this section intended by the 
BPCIA’s authors would make it a penalty because by not complying 
with the Patent Dance the biosimilar applicant is allowing the reference 
product sponsor to choose how the litigation proceeds, either the Patent 
Dance or a declaratory judgment action.  Favoring reference product 
sponsors encourages more innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
because these manufacturers know they can protect their discoveries 
from free riders.  When more innovations occur, money is saved on 
healthcare costs and lives are saved. 
C. Rewriting the Patent Dance 
It will be helpful to briefly consider some ways congressional 
members could amend the Patent Dance provisions to make their intent 
certain.  They could do this several ways: they could delete 42 U.S.C. § 
                                                          
 147.   Amgen Inc., 794 F.3d at 1353. 
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262(l)(9)(C) so that section would not be in the way of “shall” in the 
Patent Dance provisions, they could add in another section simply stating 
the Patent Dance is mandatory, or they could rewrite 42 U.S.C. § 
262(l)(9)(C) to state the interpretation they originally intended. 
Deleting 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C), the statutorily created remedy for 
nonparticipation in the Patent Dance, would be the least effective way to 
make the Patent Dance mandatory, but it would still achieve the desired 
result.  Deleting that section would be the least effective method because 
the section serves some important functions.148  However, if this section 
were deleted then essentially all of the ambiguity in the BPCIA’s use of 
the word “shall” would be removed.  The main reason the Amgen court 
does not find that “shall” means mandatory is because it finds the statute 
specifically references the possibility that the biosimilar applicant would 
not comply.  Removing this reference would also remove any ambiguity. 
The authors already have an example of how to write a provision to 
make the Patent Dance mandatory by inserting a modified version of the 
provision from the Waxman Bills.149  The provision could read: “An 
applicant or prospective applicant for a biosimilar biological product 
under this subsection may [] be compelled, by court order or otherwise, 
to initiate the procedures set forth in this paragraph.”150  This would still 
not be the best way for the authors to rewrite the BPCIA because it adds 
extra language that is not necessary, and the court would still have to 
interpret 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) which they could interpret incorrectly 
once again. 
Finally, the authors could rewrite 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) to 
explicitly state their original intent and what has been called for in this 
Note.  They could accomplish this by adding a clause to the end of 42 
U.S.C. § 262(l)(9)(C) stating: “Alternatively, the reference product 
sponsor may, by court order or otherwise, require the biosimilar 
applicant to comply with paragraph (2)(A).”  This would have all of the 
advantages already discussed in this Note, it would comply with 
legislative intent, and it would unambiguously inform the courts and the 
biologics industry that the Patent Dance is mandatory. 
 
                                                          
 148.   See supra Part III.B. 
 149.   See H.R. 1427 (Third Waxman Bill), 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009) (section (k)(18)(F) of 
the proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 262). 
 150.   See id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Patent Dance provisions of the BPCIA are mandatory.  Although 
the BPCIA’s Patent Dance provisions are somewhat ambiguous, when 
the plain meaning of the statute is combined with legislative intent it is 
clear the Federal Circuit’s ruling that the Patent Dance is optional is 
misguided.  The authors of the BPCIA had an abundance of options to 
choose from if they wanted a permissive Patent Dance.  The discussion 
drafts leading up to the BPCIA stated that the authors wanted to require 
participation in the Patent Dance.  The use of “shall” and “required” in 
the statute are plain language indicators of a mandatory provision.  
Finally, under the correct interpretation of the statute, none of the 
provisions become superfluous.  The BPCIA is an important piece of 
legislation that will save hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of 
lives due to improved access to life-saving medication, but to do that the 
provisions in it must be construed correctly. 
